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INTRODUCTION
In 1981, United Park gave Wells Fargo an Estoppel Certificate and companion Consent
and Agreement assuring Wells Fargo that the Deer Valley Lease was in full force and consenting
to its pledge to Wells Fargo, as part of a loan transaction by which Wells Fargo first became
Deer Valley's principal lender.

In that transaction, Wells Fargo purchased $6,600,000 of

Industrial Revenue Bonds and accepted a pledge of the Deer Valley Resort as collateral.
In 1982, United Park again gave Wells Fargo an Estoppel Certificate and companion
Consent and Agreement, to the same effect as those given in 1981, as part of a further loan
transaction. In the 1982 transaction, Wells Fargo approximately doubled the credit extended by
it to Deer Valley, by issuing a letter of credit securing $6,000,000 of such Bonds and again
accepting a pledge of the Resort as collateral.
By the time United Park filed its original Complaint in 1986, the credit extended by Wells
Fargo to Deer Valley included said 1981 Bonds, the letter of credit securing said 1982 Bonds,
and a line of credit, aggregating $14,592,500 principal amount. The Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth,
Tenth and Twelfth Claims of the Amended Complaint of United Park sought to wrest from
Wells Fargo the collateral which United Park, in 1981 and again in 1982, had assured Wells
Fargo was intact. Wells Fargo joined the case as intervenor in 1987 to protect its collateral from
United Park's wrongful assault.
Wells Fargo's Motion addressed only those claims directed against its collateral. They
are the Third and Fourth claims for fiduciary duty breaches, the Fifth and Sixth claims for breach
of contract and leases, the Tenth claim for breach of the implied contractual duty of good faith,
and the Twelfth claim for "reformation" of the Water Rights Purchase Agreement. Under all
of said claims, United Park sought to rescind and cancel, or render non-exclusive the Deer Valley
Lease, terminate or reform Deer Valley's rights under the Water Rights Purchase Agreement,
and terminate Deer Valley's rights under the Land Purchase Agreement.

As demonstrated below, the lower court correctly rejected United Park's effort to avoid
the bar of the affirmative assurances given by United Park to Wells Fargo. The simple fact is
that United Park has never responded to any of the facts or authority cited by Wells Fargo in
support of its Motion. Ultimately, United Park is unable to explain away the written assurances
and consents given by it to Wells Fargo.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Jurisdictional Statement of plaintiff-appellant United Park City Mines Co. ("United
Park") is not disputed.

ISSUES FOR REVIEW
1.

Did United Park fail to raise a genuine issue as to any fact material to Wells

Fargo's Motion ?
2.

Was the district court correct that the 1981 and 1982 Estoppel Certificates and

the companion Consent and Agreement papers estop United Park from asserting any supposed
defaults under or other matters as to the Deer Valley Lease which occurred prior to December
22, 1982 ?
3.

Was the district court correct that under the estoppel-by-silence doctrine, such

Certificates and companion papers likewise estop United Park from contesting the Water Rights
or Land Purchase Agreements or any other rights or matters in which United Park claims rights
adverse to Deer Valley or to Wells Fargo as Deer Valley's (in 1981, prospective) lender ?
4.

Was the district court correct that United Park waived any right to challenge the

validity of the Deer Valley Lease by having given the two Estoppel Certificates, and by having
given the two Consent and Agreement papers ?
5.

Was impairment of Wells Fargo's collateral by the grant of any remedies sought

against Deer Valley Resort established ?
2

The standard of review of the district court's grant of summary judgment pursuant to
Rule 56 is a determination whether, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the
losing party, there is no genuine dispute as to any material issues of fact or, even according to
the facts as contended by the losing party, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. This Court is free to reappraise the trial court's legal conclusions. Whether the facts
justify summary judgment is a legal conclusion for this Court to review for correctness. Blue
Cross & Blue Shield v. State, 779 P.2d 634, 636 (Utah 1989); Barber v. Farmer's Ins. Exchange,
751 P.2d 248, 251 (Utah App. 1988); Webb v. ROA. General, Inc., 152 Utah Adv. Rep. 12, 13
(Utah Ct. App.).

DETER]VflNATIVE PROVISIONS
In addition to the provisions cited in United Park's Brief, Rule 56(e), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, and Rule 4-501 (2)(b), Utah Code of Judicial Administration are determinative of
issues on appeal. Copies of the same are attached as Addendum E.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
United Park filed its original Complaint in May, 1986. (R. 2) Pursuant to leave of the
district court, Wells Fargo filed in February, 1987 its Complaint in Intervention against United
Park, seeking declaratory relief in the face of the filing of the original Complaint. (R. 2549)
Wells Fargo sought a declaratory judgment with respect to its 1981 and 1982 Mortgages (as
hereinafter identified) that United Park's giving Wells Fargo certain assurances and consents in
1981 and 1982 estopped United Park from contending that any of the GPCC or Deer Valley
defendants1 is in default under any of the "three January 1, 1971 contracts" referred to in the
1

The original Complaint was only against GPCC, AMOT, Deer Valley Resort Company
("Deer Valley") and Deer Valley's affiliated Royal Street interests. At a scheduling conference
(continued...)
3

original Complaint [namely, the "Purchase Agreement," as amended, the "Water Rights Purchase
Agreement," as amended, and the "Lease (Resort Area)," as amended] or the "Lease (Deer
Valley)," as amended (hereinafter the "Deer Valley Lease"), or from seeking to terminate or
forfeit any or all of the January 1, 1971 contracts or the Deer Valley Lease.
United Park never filed an answer or other pleading responsive to the Complaint in
Intervention. Nor did United Park ever propound any discovery to Wells Fargo.
In December, 1989, Wells Fargo filed its Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint and for
Partial Summary Judgment ("Wells Fargo's Motion"). (R. 4449) Wells Fargo's Motion addressed
only those claims directed against its collateral. They are the Third and Fourth claims for
fiduciary duty breaches, the Fifth and Sixth claims for breach of contract and leases, the Tenth
claim for breach of the implied contractual duty of good faith, and the Twelfth claim for
"reformation" of the Water Rights Purchase Agreement. Under all of said claims, United Park
sought to rescind and cancel, or render non-exclusive the Deer Valley Lease, terminate or
reform Deer Valley's rights under the Water Rights Purchase Agreement, and terminate Deer
Valley's rights under the Land Purchase Agreement.
The Motion, together with dispositive motions of the other parties adverse to United
Park, was heard and granted by the district court in April, 1990, the Honorable Pat B. Brian,
Judge, presiding. The district court determined as to Wells Fargo's Motion that United Park is
equitably estopped to assert and has waived all claims for contract termination, forfeiture,
rescission, reformation and declaratory relief sought against its borrower, Deer Valley, in the
Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Tenth and Twelfth Claims of the Amended Complaint. (R. 7821)

1

(...continued)
among all counsel preceding filing in December, 1989 of the dispositive motions now the subject
of the instant appeal, the district court advised that Wells Fargo need not file an Amended
Complaint in Intervention, given that the nature of the relief sought under United Park's
Amended Complaint is substantially the same as its original Complaint with respect to Wells
Fargo's collateral and Wells Fargo's borrower, Deer Valley.
4

United Park does not appeal from the district court's having barred it from rescission or
termination remedies. Accordingly, the remedies which United £ark still pursues against Wells
Fargo's borrower, Deer Valley, are (1) reformation of the Deer Valley Lease to eliminate the
final two 20-year extensions (the first of which would commence in the year 2011) or to provide
an increase in rentals during those extension terms, (2) reformation of the provision of the Water
Rights Purchase Agreement limiting United Park's reservation of certain water to mining use
only, and (3) damages for alleged aiding and abetting in 1985 and alleged contract breaches
occurring after May 1980.

STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS
The evidence below established the following undisputed facts material to Wells Fargo's
Motion (the same having never been responded to below or in this appeal, let alone controverted
by United Park):
1.

United Park initially leased approximately 470 acres under the Lease (Deer

Valley) dated May 1, 1975 with Greater Park City Company ("GPCC"). GPCC assigned its
interests under the Lease to Royal Street Land Company. Thereafter, the Lease was amended
by Amendments dated May 21, 1979 and July 31, 1980, between United Park and Royal Street
Land Company (as so amended, the "Deer Valley Lease"). Subsequent to those Amendments,
the tenant's leasehold estate under the Lease was further assigned to Royal Street of Utah and,
ultimately, to Deer Valley. The Amendments expanded the Lease to approximately 1,904 acres
of Resort terrain. Substantial portions of skiing on Bald and Flagstaff Mountains are located
on terrain leased under the Lease, and portions of five of the Resort's eight chair lifts are
located thereon. R. 2777-78,1135; 2791-92,1162c; 4498.
2.

In 1981, $6.6 million of bonds (the "1981 Bonds") were issued for the benefit of

Deer Valley and purchased by Wells Fargo, and the proceeds were paid to or for the benefit of
Deer Valley. Such Bonds are secured by the 1981 Mortgage (as identified in the Complaint in
5

Intervention 1f4a, R. 2461-62), under which Mortgage is pledged the entire real estate (including
the land leased under the Deer Valley Lease, as well as that purchased by Deer Valley under
the Land Purchase Agreement) and personal property compromising the operating ski resort
known as "Deer Valley Resort" (the "Resort"). R. 2462-63, H4b; 1981 Mortgage, a copy of which
is attached as Exhibit A to the Affidavit of Lee M. Jensen dated November 20,1986 [the "Jensen
Affidavit"], R. 1544, 1548.
3.

United Park gave Wells Fargo an Estoppel Certificate (the "1981 Estoppel

Certificate") stating "to and for the benefit of Wells Fargo":
1. That the Deer Valley Lease is presently in full force and effect
and has not heretofore been amended or modified except as hereinabove
specifically described and has not heretofore been terminated or
cancelled.
2. To the best of the knowledge of UPC: (a) No party to said
Deer Valley Lease is presently in default in compliance with any of the
provisions thereof, and (b) No event has occurred or circumstance exists
which constitutes such a default under the Deer Valley Lease or with the
giving of notice or passage of time, or both, would constitute a default
under said Deer Valley Lease.
R. 4474; 2463-64, 11116,7. The Certificate recited that United Park had "been advised that DVRC
intends to execute and deliver the [1981 Mortgage], which Mortgage will cover, among other
things, the rights of the Lessee under the Deer Valley Lease, which Mortgage will secure the
[1981 Bonds]," and United Park had "the knowledge and understanding that Wells Fargo will rely
[on it] in connection with the purchase by [Wells Fargo] of the [1981] Bonds," and as a stated
"condition precedent" to that purchase. Id. The 1981 Certificate, together with the 1981
Consent and Agreement, 1982 Estoppel Certificate, and 1982 Consent and Agreement defined
below, were all identified by Clark L. Wilson in his deposition, R. 7951, pp. 219-220, 224; R.
7952, pp. 361-363; a copy of the 1981 Estoppel Certificate is Addendum A.
4.

At the same time it gave Wells Fargo the 1981 Estoppel Certificate, United Park

executed and delivered to Wells Fargo a Consent and Agreement (the "1981 Consent and

6

Agreement"), which provides that Wells Fargo shall have the right to succeed to the rights of
Deer Valley upon foreclosure by Wells Fargo of the 1981 Mortgage. R. 2464, H9; a copy of the
1981 Consent and Agreement is attached as Addendum B.
5.

The 1981 Mortgage is an integral part of Wells Fargo's collateral securing

repayment of the 1981 Bonds purchased by it. Wells Fargo's purchase of the 1981 Bonds was
made in reliance upon the assurances and rights given to it by United Park in the 1981 Estoppel
Certificate and the 1981 Consent and Agreement concerning the Deer Valley Lease pledged
under that Mortgage. R. 2464-65,11119,10.
6.

In 1982, $6,000,000 of bonds (the "1982 Bonds") were issued for the benefit of

Deer Valley and purchased by Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith Incorporated ("Merrill
Lynch"), and the proceeds thereof were paid to or for the benefit of Deer Valley. A material
inducement to Merrill Lynch's purchasing such bonds was Wells Fargo's issuance of a Letter of
Credit (the "1982 Letter of Credit") in the amount of $6,742,500 as collateral which, in addition
to the Resort itself, secured the 1982 Bonds. The 1982 Letter of Credit was issued pursuant to
a Letter of Credit Agreement (the "1982 Letter of Credit Agreement") entered into by Deer
Valley with Wells Fargo as an integral part of the subject 1982 Bonds transaction. The 1982
Letter of Credit and Letter of Credit Agreement are secured by the 1982 Mortgage (as identified
in the Complaint in Intervention H4b). The Resort is pledged under the 1982 Mortgage.
Complaint in Intervention (R. 2459) H4b; a copy of the 1982 Mortgage is attached as Exhibit B
to the Jensen Affidavit (R. 1544, 1561).
7.

As part of the 1982 Bonds transaction, for the purpose of providing Wells Fargo

the same condition precedent assurances and rights concerning the Deer Valley Lease, United
Park executed and delivered to Wells Fargo an Estoppel Certificate (the "1982 Estoppel
Certificate") which is identical in all material respects to that provided in 1981; and gave Wells
Fargo a Consent and Agreement (the "1982 Consent and Agreement") likewise identical in all

7

material respects to the 1981 Consent and Agreement. R. 4482; R. 2465, HIT 11,12; copies of the
1982 Estoppel Certificate and 1982 Consent and Agreement are attached as Addenda C and D.
8.

As in 1981, the 1982 Mortgage is an integral part of Wells Fargo's collateral

securing the credit extended by it in connection with the 1982 Bonds transaction, and that
extension of credit was made in reliance upon the assurances and rights under the 1982 Estoppel
Certificate and the 1982 Consent and Agreement concerning the Deer Valley Lease. R. 246566, W13,14.
9.

Wells Fargo has also provided Deer Valley with a revolving line of credit

(hereinafter the "Line of Credit") of approximately $4.5 million in principal amount,2 which Line
of Credit is secured by various parcels of real property that are contiguous to and/or in the
immediate vicinity of the Resort (the "Line of Credit Collateral Property"), the value of which
parcels is dependant upon Deer Valley's continuing as the operator of the Resort as a ski resort
and upon denial of the various remedies sought by plaintiff against the Resort and defendant
Deer Valley. R. 2463, H5.
10.

Although Wells Fargo has been a party-intervenor since filing its Complaint in

Intervention in February, 1987, United Park has never propounded any discovery to Wells Fargo.

2

In 1987, the Line was increased to a maximum principal amount of $10,350,000, and in
1990 it was further increased to a maximum of $12,000,000.
8

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

There is no genuine issue as to any fact material to Wells Fargo's Motion.

2.

The 1981 and 1982 Estoppel Certificates and the companion Consent and

Agreement papers estop United Park from asserting any supposed defaults under or other
matters as to the Deer Valley Lease which occurred prior to December 22, 1982.
3.

Under the estoppel-by-silence doctrine, such Certificates and companion papers

likewise estop United Park from contesting the Water Rights or Land Purchase Agreements or
any other rights or matters in which United Park might have or claim rights adverse to Deer
Valley or to Wells Fargo as Deer Valley's (in 1981, prospective) lender.
4.

United Park impliedly waived any right to challenge the validity of the Deer Valley

Lease by having given the two Estoppel Certificates, and by having given the two Consent and
Agreement papers.
5.

Impairment of Wells Fargo's collateral by the grant of any remedies sought against

Deer Valley Resort was established.

9

ARGUMENT
I.

THERE IS NO GENUINE ISSUE AS TO ANY
FACT MATERIAL TO WELLS FARGO'S
MOTION.

United Park did not mention below (let alone raise a genuine dispute as to) a single one
of the facts material to Wells Fargo's Motion.3 R. 4453-57. Therefore, the same are deemed
admitted under Rule 4-501 (2)(b), Utah Code of Judicial Administration.4 Under Rule 56(e),
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment will be granted against United Park if
supported by the law as applied to such facts.5

3

See, e.g., United Park's Counter Statement of Facts in its memorandum below (R. 4563645), Part I of its Argument therein where it lists what it deems to be the nine supposedly
principal factual disputes (R. 4646-48), and Part III.A.2 of that memorandum wherein it lists the
two supposedly central "assertions" by all defendants (R. 4653) — none of which make any
mention of Wells Fargo, the 1981 or 1982 Mortgages, or the Estoppel Certificates and the
Consent and Agreement documents which are the subject of Wells Fargo's Motion.
United Park made only one mention below of Wells Fargo's Statement of Facts, wherein
it questioned paragraph 9 thereof. (R. 4562) Paragraph 9 concerns solely the Line of Credit.
For the sake of the Wells Fargo Motion, the Line of Credit could have been ignored, and Wells
Fargo was still entitled to the partial summary judgment it sought.
United Park failed to mention, let alone specifically controvert by affidavits or otherwise
any of the facts set forth in paragraphs 1 through 8 of Wells Fargo's Statement of Facts below.
R. 4453-57.
4

5

Which requires, in relevant part, that:
"All material facts set forth in the movant's [Wells Fargo's] statement and
properly supported . . . shall be deemed admitted for the purpose of
summary judgment unless specifically controverted by the opposing party's
[United Park's] statement.
The Rule provides, in relevant part, that United Park:
"may not rest upon mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but
his response, by affidavits or as otherwise as provided by this rule,
must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue
for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if
appropriate, shall be entered against him.
10

II.

ESTOPPEL APPLIES TO UNITED PARK'S
SUPPOSED CLAIMS AGAINST ROYAL. DEER
VALLEY AND RSU.

a.

The 1981 and 1982 Estoppel Certificates bar
United Park from asserting any supposed
defaults under the Deer Valley Lease which
occurred prior to December 22, 1982.

United Park tacitly admitted estoppel as to the Deer Valley Lease itself, R. 4699 ("[e]ven
assuming Wells Fargo is entitled to estoppel based on the Estoppel Certificates, rescission would
be precluded only as to the Deer Valley Lease"). It neither addressed the argument made and
authority cited by Wells Fargo, nor made any contrary argument or cited any authority of its own
as to that Lease.
On appeal, United Park contends that the "Estoppel Certificates do not bar United Park's
unconscionability claim [because] [t]hey say nothing about potential claims against Royal Street
for breach of fiduciary duty."6 (UP Brief 68) The contention is fatally flawed. United Park
observed below (correctly) that the affirmative representations in the Estoppel Certificates "refer
only to the Deer Valley Lease." R. 4699. Yet United Park admitted that the 1981 and 1982
Mortgages "[cover] all of Royal Street's property used to operate the Deer Valley resort" including
"land under the Purchase Agreement and [Deer Valley Lease]" (id.; emphasis added). The
property so covered also includes Deer Valley's water rights under the Water Rights Purchase
Agreement (R. 1721,1981 Mortgage, p. 24, Granting Clause VI; R. 1651,1982 Mortgage, p. 35,
Granting Clause VIII).

6

This contention combines a claim (of unconscionability) never asserted in the Amended
Complaint or otherwise below with an argument (about existence of "potential claims . . . for
breach of fiduciary duty") never made below in response to Wells Fargo's Motion. As such, the
subject claim and argument should not be considered by this Court. Saunders v. Sharp, 793 P.2d
927, 932 (Utah App. 1990). The question raised about who drafted the Certificates (UP Brief
68) likewise was not raised below, although the question adds nothing to United Park's argument.
11

United Park's unstated premise of its contention is that any estoppel arises only under
the Estoppel Certificates themselves, and only from affirmative representations therein. It
implies that because the affirmative representations did not extend beyond the Deer Valley
Lease to encompass the supposed breaches by Deer Valley of its supposed fiduciary duty to
United Park, therefore any estoppel arising out of the Certificates does not apply to these
supposed breaches.
The fatal flaws in its analysis are twofold. First, it ignores the facts. The plain language
of the Certificates states:
1. That the Deer Valley Lease is presently in full force and effect
and has not heretofore been amended or modified except as hereinabove
specifically described and has not heretofore been terminated or
cancelled.
2. To the best of the knowledge of UPC: (a) No party to said
Deer Valley Lease is presently in default in compliance with any of the
provisions thereof, and (b) No event has occurred or circumstance exists
which constitutes such a default under the Deer Valley Lease or with the
giving of notice or passage of time, or both, would constitute a default
under said Deer Valley Lease.
(Emphasis added.) Likewise, in the companion documents to the Certificates — the 1981 and
1982 documents each styled as "Consent and Agreement" — United Park consented to the
Mortgages themselves ("UPC hereby consents to the execution and delivery of the Mortgage,"
1981 Consent and Agreement (R. 1684), HI; 1982 Consent and Agreement (R. 1692), 111). The
same Mortgages which United Park admits "[cover] all of Royal Street's property used to operate
the Deer Valley resort" including "land under the Purchase Agreement and Ski Leases [including
the Deer Valley Lease]" (R. 4699; emphasis added) and water rights (R. 1721, 1651).
The second flaw is that the United Park contention is unsupported by a shred of
authority, and is contrary to the settled law concerning the doctrine of equitable estoppel. The
doctrine "prevents a person from showing the truth contrary to a representation of fact made by
him after another has relied on the representation." Restatement, Second, Contracts § 90,
Comment a (citing Restatement, Second, Agency § 8B; Restatement, Second, Torts §§ 872, 894).
12

Utah case law accepts and applies estoppel as a doctrine which "precludes a party from asserting
rights against another when the other party has justifiably relied on the acts, admissions,
representations, or silence of that party and changed position so that he will suffer injury if the
former party is allowed to repudiate his conduct." Rothey v. Walker Bank & Trust Company, 754
P.2d 1222, 1224 (Utah 1988) (citations omitted). Estoppel can be applied against a party
whether (1) his representations are express, (2) he is silent when he should speak, (3) his
representations are intentional or (4) his representations are negligently made. Morgan v. Board
of State Lands, 549 P.2d 695, 697 (Utah 1976).
For estoppel to apply, it is generally said that the following 5 elements must be present:
(1) representation or concealment of material facts; (2) the
representation [was] made with a knowledge of the facts; (3) the party
to whom it was made must have been ignorant of the [truth of the]
matter; (4) [the representation] must have been made with the intention
that the other party should act upon it; and (5) the other party should
have been induced to act upon it.
5

THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY

§ 2524 at 538 (1979 RepLVoL; footnote omitted). Utah courts

have been more liberal in applying the estoppel doctrine, requiring only three elements of proof:
(1) a representation, act or omission which is inconsistent with a later-asserted claim, (2)
justifiable reliance, and (3) a change of position to one's detriment based upon the justifiable
reliance which will result if the first party is permitted to change his position. Rothey at 1224;
Brixen & Christopher, Architects v. Elton, 111 P.2d 1039 (Utah App. 1989) (citing six other Utah
cases).
The 1981 and 1982 Estoppel Certificates both state, as of their respective dates in 1981
and 1982, that they are given as a "condition precedent" to the closing of the Bonds transactions,
and specifically state that:
[T]he Deer Valley Lease is presently in full force and effect. . .
To the best of the knowledge of UPC: (a) No party to said Deer
Valley Lease is presently in default in compliance with any of the
provisions thereof, and (b) No event has occurred or circumstance exists
which constitutes such a default under the Deer Valley Lease or with the
13

giving of notice or passage of time, or both, would constitute a default
under said Deer Valley Lease.
This Estoppel Certificate is executed and delivered by UPC to
Wells Fargo with the knowledge and understanding that Wells Fargo will
rely hereon.
Thus, the Certificates on their face satisfy Thompson's elements 1 (the Certificates represent that
the subject Lease is in full force, with no existing or potential defaults) and 4 (they both state
United Park's intention that Wells Fargo rely on them, even going so far as being identified
therein as "conditions precedent" to Wells Fargo's closing of the respective Bonds transactions).
It is clear that element 3 is satisfied — Wells Fargo did not have knowledge of the facts; thus,
their requirement for the Estoppel Certificates.

Element 5 is also clearly satisfied — the

condition precedent (execution of the Estoppel Certificates) having been fulfilled, Wells Fargo
did, in fact complete the Bonds transactions.
Whether United Park had complete knowledge of the facts at the time of execution of
the Certificates is irrelevant. Commentators and courts that have considered the question of the
representing person's knowledge (or lack of it) have concluded that the real focus is on prejudice
to the party to whom the representation was made (Wells Fargo). Thus, it generally is the law
that element 2 is not required to be present at all in order for estoppel to apply. Referring to the
Restatement, Second, Torts:
§ 894. Equitable Estoppel as a Defense
(1) If one person makes a definite misrepresentation of fact to another
person having reason to believe that the other will rely upon it and the
other in reasonable reliance upon it does an act [i.e., extends credit] that
would not constitute a tort if the misrepresentation were true, the first
person is not entitled . . . .
(b) to regain property or its value that
the other acquired by the act [i.e., the pledge of the Deer Valley Lease
to Wells Fargo], if the other in reliance upon the misrepresentation and
before discovery of the truth has so changed his position that it would be
unjust to deprive him of that which he thus acquired.
Restatement, Second, Torts § 894. Comment b to subsection (1) specifically addresses the
knowledge question:
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b.
Knowledge and intent. The rule stated in this Subsection
is operative although the one making the misrepresentation believes that
his statement is true . . . Furthermore, it is immaterial whether the
person making the representation exercised due care in making the
statement; it is even immaterial that he did not intend to make the
manifestation that he made, and the rule operates although he was
negligent and although he stated something different from what he
intended, provided that his conduct caused the other reasonably to
believe that the state of facts upon which the other based his conduct
actually existed.
Id. According to Thompson,
There must have been either an intention to deceive, or such gross
negligence as to amount to constructive fraud, or admissions,
declarations, or conduct intended or calculated, or such as might
reasonably have been expected, to influence the other party to act in
accordance therewith. Under this doctrine liability resulting from
estoppel arises despite intention, because the other party will be
prejudiced. . . . [I]t is sufficient if the person against whom estoppel is
asserted by his silence or representation has created a belief of the
existence of a state of facts which it would be unconscionable to deny.
5

THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY

§ 2524 at 540-41 (1979 Repl.VoL; footnotes omitted, emphasis

added).
Thus, a Georgia court, faced with tenants who had given an estoppel certificate to their
landlord stating that they were the tenants individually and attaching a copy of the restaurant
lease there involved and who thereafter contended that their successor held the premises under
a lease to a corporation, held such tenants estopped so to contend:
If appellees Allen and Gagarin are not estopped by the unqualified
certificate they signed, even if they did so negligently, no prospective
landlord would ever be entitled to rely upon the express declarations
given to his predecessor in title by purported tenants in possession.
Instead, a successor in title would always face the possibility that
possession of the premisses will subsequently be asserted on entirely
different terms from those which he had been led to believe existed. An
estoppel's "'binding effect is between the immediate parties, their privies
in blood, in law and by estate.' [Cits.]" (Emphasis supplied.) Jones v.
Major, 80 Ga.App. 223, 225, 55 S.E.2d 846 (1949)
[W]e hold that
public policy, good faith, equity and justice require that the unqualified
writing executed by appellees Allen and Gagarin estop them from raising
their novation defense.
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Virginia Highland Associates v. Allen et al.9 330 S.E.2d 892, 896 (Ga.Ct.App. 1985; emphasis in
decision).
Estoppel of a party on the basis of negligent representations is supported in Utah case
law cited above. If, in fact, United Park did not have the knowledge necessary to make the
statements in the Estoppel Certificates, it was negligent in executing the Certificates without
having made an effort to ascertain the true facts. This type of negligence is clearly within the
purview of equitable estoppel. Morgan at 697.
United Park executed and delivered the Estoppel Certificates which expressly and
unambiguously represented that the Deer Valley Lease was in full force and that no event had
occurred or circumstance existed which constituted a default under the Deer Valley Lease or
with the giving of notice or passage of time would constitute a default under the Lease. It
contemporaneously executed and delivered the Consent and Agreement papers, consenting to
Deer Valley's pledge of the entire Resort to Wells Fargo, including the Lease. Acting in
reasonable reliance upon those representations and consents, Wells Fargo purchased or extended
credit for the purchase of over twelve million dollars worth of bonds in the two transactions. If
United Park is now permitted to change its position and assert claims under the Deer Valley
Lease, Wells Fargo's collateral will be significantly impaired.7
Having given the Estoppel Certificates and companion Consent and Agreement papers,
whether knowingly or negligently, United Park is bound by them and estopped to assert any
default under or matter predating the Deer Valley Lease as a basis for affecting the Deer Valley
Lease in any way (whether reformation, or whatever). Consequently, Wells Fargo was entitled
to summary judgment dismissing the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Tenth and Twelfth Claims.

7

See Part IV, infra. Indeed, given the importance of such certificates to commercial
financing in Utah and throughout the United States, a decision denying Wells Fargo the benefit
of estoppel in the face of the subject Certificates could well have a chilling effect on commercial
financing in Utah.
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b.

United Park's failure to assert prior to .
December 22, 1982 any of the non-Deer
Valley Lease matters now asserted against
Royal, Deer Valley and RSU bars it from
asserting the same.

The 1981 and 1982 Estoppel Certificates failed to mention (and United Park did not
otherwise - at the time it gave them in 1981 and 1982, or at any time prior to filing its original
Complaint herein — mention to Wells Fargo) the Water Rights or Land Purchase Agreements
or any other rights or matters in which United Park might have or claim rights adverse to Deer
Valley or to Wells Fargo as Deer Valley's (in 1981, prospective) lender.
Under its Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Tenth and Twelfth Claims, United Park sought to
terminate, take back and/or modify water rights and land purchase rights which are (but for such
claims) assets of Deer Valley, and an integral part of the Deer Valley Resort. Wells Fargo
would not have closed the 1981 or 1982 Bonds transactions "but for" United Park's affirmative
acts of giving the 1981 and 1982 Estoppel Certificates — Wells Fargo's receipt of the Certificates
being acknowledged by United Park therein as a "condition precedent" to closing. R. 4474, 4483.
The law is that a person's silence estops him from raising the matter about which he fails
to speak if he ought in conscience to have spoken:
[W]here his silence enables him to acquire unfair advantage over another
in the settlement of property rights, it is his duty to speak. Guilty silence
may work an estoppel as effectually as an express representation. In
order that silence may amount to acquiescence in a statement or charge,
so as to constitute a basis for estoppel, it must appear that the statement
or charge, if wrong, would naturally, or with great probability, have
brought contradiction, that absence of contradiction gives assurance of
truth. . . . If one remains silent when he ought in good conscience to
have spoken then he will not be permitted to speak when conscience
requires him to keep silent. Such silence is the equivalent of
concealment.
5

THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY

§ 2525 at 555-56 (1979 Repl.Vol.; footnotes omitted). When a

party remains silent when he should assert his claims and another acts in detrimental reliance in
the face of the silence, the silence constitutes a clear basis for application of the doctrine of
17

estoppel. Rothey at 1224; Morgan at 697. This is particularly so where, as here, the silent party
consented to the Mortgages under which were pledged the entirety of the Resort — water rights
and all — in the companion Consent and Agreement papers.
United Park should not now have the benefit of its silence with respect to the Water
Rights and Land Purchase Agreements in the face of its affirmative assurances concerning the
Deer Valley Lease involving the very same Resort, and of its consent to the Resort-pledging
Mortgages. Therefore, it is estopped to assert the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Tenth and Twelfth
Claims to the detriment of Wells Fargo's interests, and they were properly dismissed.8
III.

WAIVER APPLIES TO UNITED PARK'S
SUPPOSED CLAIMS AGAINST ROYAL. DEER
VALLEY AND RSU.

United Park impliedly waived any right to challenge the validity of the Deer Valley Lease
by having given the two Estoppel Certificates, and by having given the two Consent and
Agreement papers.9
A "waiver" is generally defined as the intentional relinquishment of a known right. See,
e.g., 5

THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY

§ 2524, n. 28 and accompanying text (1979 Repl.Vol.).

United Park contends that the 1981 and 1982 Estoppel Certificates do not give rise to waivers
as to prior defaults under the Deer Valley Lease, or with respect to the water rights, land
purchase agreements and other matters now complained of by United Park, on the basis that
United Park did not know of such prior defaults at the time it gave the estoppel certificates. UP
Brief 68. However, waiver may be implied where estoppel lies:

8

United Park failed below and now before this Court to address application of this
estoppel-by-silence doctrine and authority (cited by Wells Fargo in its opening memorandum filed
in the district court, R. 4463-64) to the Water Agreement and to all other documents and
matters beyond the narrow confines of affirmative representations in the Estoppel Certificates
or the Consent and Agreement papers concerning the Deer Valley Lease itself.
9

Once again, United Park made no mention of or response to (below or on this appeal)
this argument by Wells Fargo.
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[T]he line of demarcation between [waiver and estoppel] is said to be
very slight, since both partake of somewhat the same elements and ask
essentially the same relief. The terms are frequently and loosely used as
convertible, especially where waivers implied, and estoppels arising from
conduct are involved, the dividing line being very shadowy in such cases
and it often being a difficult question to determine just where the
doctrine of implied waiver ends and that of estoppel begins.
31 C.J.S. Estoppel § 61 at 385-86 (footnotes omitted). Thus, waiver was found against anchor
shopping center tenant Piggly Wiggly, which sought to obtain against its landlord an injunction
against violation of a lease clause prohibiting other tenants [including third-party defendant WalMart] in the center from selling groceries, on the basis that Piggly Wiggly was presumed to have
read and intended the words contained in the estoppel certificate it signed:
[W]e find that Thompkin's execution of the "estoppel certificate" on
behalf of Piggly Wiggly constituted an express waiver by that party of any
right it might have under the lease to enjoin the lessor from violation of
the clause in question with regard to the sale by Wal-Mart of grocery
items in the shopping center. ThompMns is presumed to have read and
understood the certificate which provided that as of May 8, 1981 neither
the landlord nor Piggly Wiggly was in default of the terms of the lease.
Wal-Mart had opened for business in the shopping center on September
23, 1980, and began selling grocery items, some eight months before
Thompkins signed the certificate.
Piggly Wiggly v. Wolpert Associates, 519 So.2d 371, 373 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1988; emphasis added).
In the Consent and Agreement it gave in both 1981 and 1982, United Park expressly
agreed that either Wells Fargo or its Trustee could succeed, without United Park's consent, to
Deer Valley's rights under the Deer Valley Lease. This agreement implies the validity of the
Deer Valley Lease and amounts to a knowing waiver of any subsequent claim that the leasehold
is invalid. Moreover, by this agreement, United Park has granted Wells Fargo independent rights
in and under the Lease.
The waiver may also, as discussed above, be inferred from the Estoppel Certificates
executed and delivered by United Park. United Park's change of management gives it no greater
rights than it had when it gave the 1981 and 1982 Estoppel Certificates - by giving those
certificates, it waived any defaults under the Deer Valley Lease predating the Certificates.
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Because the events upon which it bottoms its efforts in this litigation to secure reformation of
the Deer Valley Lease occurred in 1971 and 1975, years before those certificates were given to
Wells Fargo, United Park waived its ability to complain of the same.
IV.

IMPAIRMENT OF WELLS
FARGO'S
COLLATERAL BY THE GRANT OF ANY
REMEDIES SOUGHT AGAINST DEER VALLEY
RESORT WAS ESTABLISHED.

United Park boldly asserts that "Wells Fargo made no showing of any undue prejudice
to support an estoppel of United Park's reformation claims." UP Brief 68.10 It gives two
supposed examples — (1) "Reformation of the Water Agreement to permit United Park to use
its reserved water for all purposes cannot possibly prejudice Wells Fargo [because] [d]ue to
United Park's prior reservation of water for mining, milling and related purposes, neither Royal
Street nor its lender, Wells Fargo, could have relied on that water," and (2) "As to United Park's
prayer that the two 20-year lease extensions given in 1975 for no consideration be canceled,
Wells Fargo made no showing that, or to what extent, its security would be impaired." Id.
These examples do not withstand scrutiny. United Park ignores the economic reality that
Wells Fargo relies for repayment of its loans not only on the collateral pledged to it, but on the
day-to-day viability of Deer Valley Resort as a source of payment in the ordinary course of
amounts due under the loans. The Resort is made up of a patchwork quilt of fee land owned
by Deer Valley (1981 Mortgage, R. 1716-20, pp. 19-23; 1982 Mortgage, R. 1642-50, pp. 26-34)
on which the day lodges, parking areas and other facilities are located, and various leasehold
lands (1981 Mortgage, R. 1699-1716, pp. 2-19; 1982 Mortgage, R. 1619-42, pp. 2-26), including
10

As with its other appellate contention concerning Wells Fargo {see n. 4, supra), United
Park improperly raises this matter for the first time on appeal, and the same should not be
considered by this Court. The closest United Park came concerns example (1) noted herein, by
its assertion below (without further analysis or support) that Wells Fargo's position as a secured
lender would not be "jeopardized" by United Park's "damage claims" or "claim for reformation
of the Water Agreement." R. 4700. In all events, the standard is not one of "undue prejudice"
(for which United Park cites no authority), but of "detriment." See discussion and authority in
Part Il.a., supra.
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the lands leased under the Deer Valley Lease itself. On the Deer Valley Lease leasehold land,
substantial portions of skiing terrain on Bald and Flagstaff Mountains are located, including
portions of the Sterling, Wasatch, Sultan, Clipper and Carpenter chair lifts (such lifts being all
but three of the lifts at Deer Valley Resort). Because of the skiing terrain and chair lifts located
on such land, loss of the Deer Valley Lease would destroy Deer Valley Resort. These matters
were established by Wells Fargo below. R. 4453-54,11111,2; R. 4499-4500, IfE.
It is no answer to say — as United Park does by its second example — that the Resort and
its lender have 20 years left. That is, a critical component of "present value" is permanence. The
glittering success embodied by Deer Valley Resort and the homes and businesses that have
sprung up as a part of its community would be immediately chilled by present termination of the
Deer Valley Lease effective a scant 20 years from now.11 Home builders and buyers, hotel
operators and others would cease making the substantial capital investments involved in such
enterprises, and the community would overnight lose its carefully nurtured momentum and watch
the 20-year clock run out.
As for water under United Park's first example, Deer Valley struck a bargain in 1971
entitling it to whatever water was not used for mining purposes pursuant to United Park's
mining-purposes reservation in the Water Rights Purchase Agreement. R. 2760, 11167. This
water entitlement was then and is now an asset of Deer Valley, and is encompassed by the
pledge of Deer Valley's water rights to Wells Fargo under the Mortgages. R. 1721, 1981
Mortgage, p. 24, Granting Clause VI; R. 1651, 1982 Mortgage, p. 35, Granting Clause VIII.
Wells Fargo relied upon the pledge of Deer Valley's water rights, in that Wells Fargo relied upon
the availability of adequate water as an integral part of its collateral, a functioning ski resort, in
consummating loan transactions in 1981, again in 1982, and continues to rely now as Wells Fargo
proceeds into the 1990s as Deer Valley's lender. R. 4455-56,11115,8. Indeed, the water had a

11

The result of the cancellation of the last two of the three 20-year extension terms of the
Lease sought by United Park. The original term expires April 30, 1991, and the first of the 20year extension terms thereupon commences.
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likely availability (and value) to Deer Valley even at the time of the restructuring transactions
in 1975 — United Park's inability to use the water for mining was then foreseeable, because
United Park knew at that time that neither it nor Park Ventures had been able to show a profit
from mining operations. UP Exs. (R. 5164), Vol III, Ex. 3, p. 19. The water is presently and in
the future available for Deer Valley's use in snowmaking or for other purposes (or for sale to
a third party). In sum, it is incontestable that loss of this asset to United Park's reformation
claim would diminish Wells Fargo's collateral, and thereby be a detriment to Wells Fargo.12

CONCLUSION
In 1981 and 1982, United Park certified to Wells Fargo there were no defaults under the
Deer Valley Lease, and consented to the pledge to it of the Deer Valley Resort - land, water
rights, ski lifts and all. United Park is now barred by the doctrines of estoppel and waiver from
undermining those pledges based upon events prior to 1982. For these reasons, Wells Fargo
respectfully urges that the district court's summary judgment dismissing the Third, Fourth, Fifth,
Sixth, Tenth and Twelfth Claims of United Park be affirmed.
DATED this 15th day of February, 1991.
PRUITT, GUSHEE & BACHTELL
Attorneys for Intervenor-Appellee
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.

Michael F. Jones

12

United Park's argument appears disingenuous where the Park City/Deer Valley aquifers
are fully appropriated — that is, the basin is closed to new appropriations. Indeed, the economic
value of this scarce asset is particularly great in a year where the Wasatch Front is experiencing
another in a string of below-normal "water years" (creating the likelihood that those who have
water rights bearing a late priority date will not have water available to them).
22

ADDENDUM A

A-1

ESTOPPEL CERTIFICATE
THIS ESTOPPEL CERTIFICATE, executed this ^ ^ day of
Fiiftrnnry, 1981, by UNITED PARK CITY MINES COMPANY, a Delaware
corporation (herein designated "UPC");
W I T N E S S E T H :
WHEREAS, UPC, as "Lessor", and Greater Park City Company,
as "Lessee", mutually executed and delivered a certain Lease (Deer
Valley), dated as of May 1, 1975 (the "Lease"), the rights of the
Lessee under which Lease were assigned to Royal Street Land Company pursuant to a certain Assignment of Lease, dated as of
October 11, 1975, between Greater Park City Company, as "Assignor",
and Royal Street Land Company, as "Assignee", which Assignment of
Lease with a copy of said Lease attached, was recorded as Entry
No. 145104, in Book M110, Pages 755 to 797, Records of Summit
County, Utah, and as Entry No. 112813, in Book 118, Pages 104 to
146, Records of Wasatch County, Utah; and
WHEREAS, said Lease was amended by an Amendment to Deer
Valley Lease, dated May 21f 1979, and a Second Amendment to Deer
Valley Lease, dated July 31. 1980, between UPC and Royal Street
Land Company; and
WHEREAS, the rights of the Lessee under said Lease as
amended by the aforesaid Amendment to Deer Valley Lease and Second
Amendment to Deer Valley Lease (which Lease, as so amended, is
herein designated the "Deer Valley Lease"), have heretofore by
successive assignments been assigned to Royal Street of Utah and
by Royal Street of Utah to Deer Valley Resort Company ("DVRC");
and
WHEREAS, UPC has been advised that DVRC intends to execute and deliver a certain Mortgage, Security Agreement and

Financing Agreement, wherein DVRC is designated as "Company" and
First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. is designated as "Trustee" (the
"Mortgage"), which Mortgage will cover, among other things, the
rights of the Lessee under the Deer Valley Lease, which Mortgage
will secure payment of amounts due pursuant to an aggregate of
Six Million Six Hundred Thousand Dollars ($6,600,000.00) principal
amount of Industrial Development Revenue Bonds (Deer Valley Resort
Company Project), Series 1981, issued by Park City, Summit County,
Utah (the "Bonds") and certain additional bonds which might hereafter be issued by Park City, Summit County, Utah.
NOW, THEREFORE, as a condition precedent to the purchase
by Wells Fargo Bank, National Association ("Wells Fargo"), of the
Bonds, UPC hereby certifies to and for the benefit of Wells Fargo
as follows:
1.

That the Deer Valley Lease is presently in full force

and effect and has not heretofore been amended or modified except
as hereinabove specifically described and has not heretofore been
terminated or cancelled.
2.

To the best of the knowledge of UPC:

(a) No party

to said Deer Valley Lease is presently in default in compliance
with any of the provisions thereof, and (b) No event has occurred
or cirexamstance exists which constitutes such a default under the
Deer Valley Lease or with the giving of notice or passage of time,
or both, would constitute a default under said Deer Valley Lease.
This Estoppel Certificate is executed and delivered by
UPC to Wells Fargo with the knowledge and understanding that Wells
Fargo will rely hereon in connection with the purchase by it of
the Bonds.
UNITED PARK CITY MINES COMPANY

ADDENDUM B

B-1

CONSENT AND AGREEMENT
THIS CONSENT AND AGREEMENT, made and entered into this
3*** day of Fciruary, 1981, by and between UNITED PARK CITY MINES
COMPANY, a Delaware corporation (hereinafter designated

,f

UPC M ),

WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., a national banking association (hereinafter
designated "Wells Fargo"), and FIRST SECURITY BANK OF UTAH, NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION (hereinafter designated "Trustee");
W I T N E S S E T H :
WHEREAS, Deer Valley Resort Company, as "Company" has
executed and delivered to Trustee a certain Mortgage, Security
Agreement, and Financing Statement (herein designated the "Mortgage"), dated as of January 1, 1981, which Mortgage relates to
certain real property and leasehold estates with relation to
real property situated in Summit County, Utah and Wasatch County,
Utah; and
WHEREAS, a portion of the property which is the subject
of the Mortgage is the leasehold estate created pursuant to a
certain Lease (Deer Valley), dated as of May 1, 1975, between UPC,
as "Lessor", and Greater Park City Company, as "Lessee", the rights
of the Lessee under which Lease (peer Valley) were assigned to
Royal Street Land Company, pursuant to a certain Assignment of
Lease dated October 11, 1975, between Greater Park City Company,
as "Assignor" and Royal Street Land Company, as "Assignee", which
Assignment of Lease with a copy of said Lease (Deer Valley) at*
tached is recorded as Entry No. 145104, in Book M H O , Pages 755 to
797, in the office of the County Recorder of Summit County, Utah,
and as Entry No. 112831, in Book 118, Pages 104 to 146, in the
office of the County Recorder of Wasatch County, Utah; and

WHEREAS, said Lease (Deer Valley) was amended by an
Amendment to Deer Valley Lease, dated May 21, 1979, and a Second
Amendment to Deer Valley Lease dated July 31, 1980, between UPC
and Royal Street Land Company; and
WHEREAS, the rights of the Lessee under said Lease (Deer
Valley) as so amended, were subsequently assigned by Royal Street
Land Company to Royal Street of Utah and by Royal Street of Utah
to Deer Valley Resort Company (hereinafter designated "DVRC"),
which is the present ovmer of the rights of the Lessee under said .
Lease (Deer Valley)., as amended by said Amendment to Deer Valley
Lease and said Second Amendment to Deer Valley Lease, which Lease
(Deer Valley) as so amended is hereinafter designated the "Deer
Valley Lease11; and
WHEREAS, UPC, as Lessor under said Deer Valley Lease, is
willing to consent to the execution and delivery of the Mortgage
and to make the agreements herein contained.
NOW, THEREFORE, for good and valuable consideration, receipt and sufficiency whereof are hereby acknowledged, UPC agrees
with and for the benefit of Trustee and Wells Fargo as follows:
1,

In accordance with Paragraph 18 of the Deer Valley

Lease, UPC hereby consents to the execution and delivery of the
Mortgage.
2.

UPC hereby agrees that, in the event of foreclosure

of the Mortgage, the rights of the Lessee under the Deer Valley
Lease may be sold at foreclosure sale to Trustee or Wells Fargo
without the necessity of obtaining the consent of UPC pursuant to
Paragraph 18 of the Deer Valley Lease.

UPC further agrees that,

in the event of such sale to Trustee or Wells Fargo, and in the
event that Trustee or Wells Fargo should elect to subsequently
sell or assign said rights of the Lessee under the Deer Valley
Lease to a third party, the consent of UPC to such sale or assignment pursuant to Paragraph 18 of the Deer Valley Lease will not
unreasonably be withheld.
-2-

3,

UPC agrees that, in the event of the foreclosure of

the Mortgage, the consent of UPC pursuant to Paragraph 18 of the
Deer Valley Lease to a sale at foreclosure sale to a party other
than Trustee or Wells Fargo will not unreasonably be withheld,
4.

UPC agrees that, in the event of default by DVRC in

performance of the obligations of the Lessee under the Deer Valley
Lease, and in the event that at any time during which the Mortgage
remains in force and effect, UPC should elect to give notice of
said default pursuant to the Deer Valley Lease, UPC will, concurrently with the mailing of said notice to DVRC, mail copies of
said notice, by certified mail or registered mail, return receipt
requested, addressed to Trustee and Wells Fargo at the following
addresses:
Wells Fargo Bank, National
Association
420 Montgomery Street
San Francisco, California 94104
Attention: Corporate Banking Group
North American Division
Western Region
and
First Security Bank of Utah, N.A.
79 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attention:

Trust Department

or at such other address or addresses as Trustee or Wells Fargo
shall hereafter designate to UPC in writing; provided, however,
that if by reason of any inadvertence or mistake notice to Trustee
and/or Wells Fargo is not given, or though given, is not received
for any reason, UPC would not be liable for any loss or damage
resulting from such failure; provided, however, that in the event
of,failure of UPC to give such notice to Trustee or Wells Fargo,
or failure of Trustee or Wells Fargo to receive such notice, UPC
shall not have the right to terminate the Deer Valley Lease or
exercise any of the other rights of UPC thereunder by reason of

-3-

such default unless and until 30 days after copies of such notice
shall have been delivered to Trustee and Wells Fargo and unless
such default shall not have been cured before the end of said 30
day period.
6.

Except as expressly set forth herein, this Consent

and Agreement shall not be deemed to amend or modify the Deer
Valley Lease in any manner whatsoever.
7.

This Consent and Agreement is executed solely for

the benefit of Trustee and Wells Fargo, may not be transferred
or assigned by Trustee or Wells Fargo without the prior written
consent of UPC, and may not be enforced or relied upon by any
party other than Trustee or Wells Fargo.
8.

This Consent and Agreement shall be interpreted and

enforced in accordance with the laws of the State of Utah,
^/

M4Yck

DATED this < Z ^ day of Zohxua&y,

1981.

UNITED PARK CITY MINES COMPANY

ATTEST:

Secretary

-4-

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
t ss
)

On this £*^ day of y?l<znsJL
, 1981, personally
appeared before me
PLz«J X _uJj iU^^
, who 7 being by me duly
sworn, did say that he is the vice President of United Park City
Mines Company, a Delaware corporation, and that the within and
foregoing Consent and Agreement was signed on behalf of said corporation by authority of a resolution of its Board of Directors,
and said
([J^uJt. rf. /AMJJ^-^
duly acknowledged to me that
said corporation executed the same~~ahd that the seal affixed is
the seal of said corporation.

Residing at: J*M.
My Commission Expires:

7r
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ADDENDUM C

C-1

ESTOPPEL CERTIFICATE
THIS ESTOPPEL CERTIFICATE, executed this >^ - " day of
December, 1982, by UNITED PARK CITY MINES COMPANY, a Delaware
corporation (herein designated "UPC");
W I T N E S S E T H :
WHEREAS, UPC, as "Lessor", and Greater Park City Company, as "Lessee", mutually executed and delivered a certain
Lease (Deer Valley), dated as of May 1, 1975 (the "Lease"), the
rights of the Lessee under which Lease were assigned to Royal
Street Land Company pursuant to a certain Assignment of Lease,
dated as of October 11, 1975, between Greater Park City Company, as "Assignor", and Royal Street Land Company, as "Assignee", which Assignment of Lease with a copy of said Lease attached, was recorded as Entry No. 145104, in Book MHO, Pages
755 to 797, Records of Summit County, Utah, and as Entry No.
112813, in Book 118, Pages 104 to 146, Records of Wasatch County, Utah; and
WHEREAS, said Lease was amended by an Amendment to
Deer Valley Lease, dated May 21, 1979, and a Second Amendment
to Deer Valley Lease, dated July 31, 1980, between UPC and
Royal Street Land Company; and
WHEREAS, the rights of the Lessee under said Lease as
amended by and aforesaid Amendment to Deer Valley Lease and
Second Amendment to Deer Valley Lease (which Lease, as so amended, is herein designated the "Deer Valley Lease"), have heretofore by successive assignments been assigned to Royal Street
of Utah and by Royal Street of Utah to Deer Valley Resort Company ("DVRC"); and

WHEREAS, UPC has been advised that DVRC intends to
execute and deliver a certain Mortgage, Security Agreement and
Financing Agreement, wherein DVRC is designated as "Company"
and Wells Fargo Bank, National Association ("Wells Fargo") is
designated as "Bank") (the "Mortgage"), which Mortgage will
cover, among other things, the rights of the Lessee under the
Deer Valley Lease, which Mortgage will secure payment of
amounts due pursuant to a Letter of Credit Agreement between
DVRC and Wells Fargo relating to the issuance by Wells Fargo of
a Letter of Credit to the purchaser of an aggregate of Six
Million Dollars (§6,000,000.00) principal amount of Industrial
Development Revenue Bonds (Deer Valley Resort Company Project),
Series 1982, issued by Park City, Summit County, Utah (the
"Bonds").
NOW, THEREFORE, as a condition precedent to the issuance by Wells Fargo of said Letter of Credit, UPC hereby
certifies to and for the benefit of Wells Fargo as follows:
1.

That the Deer Valley Lease is presently in full

force and effect and has not heretofore been amended or modified except as hereinabove specifically described and has not
heretofore been terminated or cancelled.
2.

To the best of the knowledge of UPC:

(a) No party

to said Deer Valley Lease is presently in default in compliance
with any of the provisions thereof, and (b) No event has occurred or circumstance exists which constitute such a default
under the Deer Valley Lease or with the giving of notice or
passage of time, or both, would constitute a default under said
Deer Valley Lease.

This Estoppel Certificate is executed and delivered by
UPC to Wells Fargo with the knowledge and understanding that
Wells Fargo will rely hereon in connection with the issuance by
it of said Letter of Credit.
UNITED PARK CITY MINES COMPANY

By

jLi >JL^^
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ADDENDUM D
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CONSENT AND AGREEMENT
THIS CONSENT AND AGREEMENT, made and entered into this
>r*^day of December, 1982, by and between UNITED PARK CITY
MINES COMPANY, a Delaware corporation (hereinafter designated
"UPC") and WELLS FARGO BANK, National Association, a national
banking association (hereinafter designated "Wells Fargo");
W I T N E S S E T H :
WHEREAS, Deer Valley Resort Company, as "Company" has
executed and delivered to Wells Fargo a certain Mortgage, Security Agreement, and Financing Statement (herein designated the
"Mortgage"), dated as of January 1, 1981, which Mortgage relates to certain real property and leasehold estates with relation to real property situated in Summit County, Utah and
Wasatch County, Utah; and
WHEREAS, a portion of the property which is the subject of the Mortgage is the leasehold estate created pursuant
to a certain Lease (Deer Valley), dated as of May 1, 1975,
between UPC, as "Lessor", and Greater Park City Company, as
"Lessee", the rights of the Lessee under which Lease (Deer
Valley) were assigned to Royal Street Land Company, pursuant to
a certain Assignment of Lease dated October 11, 1975, between
Greater Park City Company, as "Assignor" and Royal Street Land
Company, as "Assignee", which Assignment of Lease with a copy
of said Lease (Deer Valley) attached is recorded as Entry No.
154104, in Book M H O , Pages 755 to 797, in the office of the
County Recorder of Summit County, Utah, and as Entry No.
112831, in Book 118, Pages 104 to 146, in the office of the
County Recorder of Wasatch County, Utah; and

WHEREAS, said Lease (Deer Valley) was amended by an
Amendment to Deer Valley Lease, dated May 21, 1979, and a
Second Amendment to Deer Valley Lease dated July 31, 1980,
between UPC and Royal Street Land Company; and
WHEREAS, the rights of the Lessee under said Lease
(Deer Valley) as so amended, were subsequently assigned by
Royal Street Land Company to Royal Street of Utah and by Royal
Street of Utah to Deer Valley Resort Company (herein designated
"DVRC"), which is the present owner of the rights of the Lessee
under said Lease (Deer Valley), as amended by said Amendment to
Deer Valley Lease and said Second Amendment to Deer Valley
Lease, which Lease (Deer Valley) as so amended is hereinafter
designated the "Deer Valley Lease"); and
WHEREAS, UPC, as Lessor under said Deer Valley Lease,
is willing to consent

o the execution and delivery of the

Mortgage and to make the agreements herein contained.
NOW, THEREFORE, for good and valuable consideration,
receipt and sufficiency whereof are hereby acknowledged, UPC
agrees with and for the benefit of Wells Fargo as follows:
1.

In accordance with Paragraph 18 of the Deer Valley

Lease, UPC hereby consents to the execution and delivery of the
Mortgage.
2.

UPC hereby agrees that, in the event of foreclo-

sure of the Mortgage, the rights of the Lessee under the Deer
Valley Lease may be sold at foreclosure sale to Wells Fargo
without the necessity of obtaining the consent of UPC pursuant
to Paragraph 18 of the Deer Valley Lease.

UPC further agrees

that, in the event of such sale to Wells Fargo, and in the
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event that Wells Fargo should elect to subsequently sell or
assign said rights of the Lessee under the Deer Valley Lease to
a third party, the consent of UPC to such sale or assignment
pursuant to Paragraph 18 of the Deer Valley Lease will not
unreasonably be withheld.
3.

UPC agrees that, in the event of the foreclosure

of the Mortgage, the consent of UPC pursuant to Paragraph 18 of
the Deer Valley Lease to a sale at foreclosure sale to a party
other than Wells Fargo will not unreasonably be withheld.
4.

UPC agrees that, in the event of default by DVRC

in performance of the obligations of the Lessee under the Deer
Valley Lease, and in the event that at any time during which
the Mortgage remains in force and effect, UPC should elect to
give notice of said default pursuant to the Deer Valley Lease,
UPC will, concurrently with the

^ailing of said notice to DVRC,

mail copies of said notice, by certified mail or registered
mail, return receipt requested, addressed to Wells Fargo at the
following addresses:
Wells Fargo Bank, National
Association
420 Mortgomery Street
San Francisco, California 94104
Attention: Corporate Banking Group
Division I (WFCS - Denver
Liaison Officer)
and
c/o Wells Fargo Corporate Services
4949 South Syracuse, Suite 3800
Denver, Colorado 80237
Attention: Regional Manager
or at such other address or addresses as Wells Fargo shall
hereafter designate to UPC in writing; provided, however, that
if by reason of any inadvertence or mistake notice to Wells
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Fargo is not given, or though given, is not received for any
reason, UPC would not be liable for any loss or damage resulting from such failure, provided, however, that in the event of
failure of UPC to give such notice to Wells Fargo, or failure
of Wells Fargo to receive such notice, UPC shall not have the
right to terminate the Deer Valley Lease or exercise any of the
other rights of UPC thereunder by reason of such default unless
and until 30 days after copies of such notice shall have been
delivered to Wells Fargo or such greater period as may be permitted to the Lessee under said Deer Valley Lease and unless
such default shall not have been cured before the end of said
30 day (or longer, as the case may be) period.
5.

UPC agrees that, in the event it should give no-

tice of default pursuant to the Deer Valley Lease, at any time
during which the Mortgage remains in fore

and effect, Wells

Fargo shall have the right, but not the duty, to take such
action and make such payments as are necessary to cure said
default and thereby avoid enforcement by UPC of the remedies
provided by the Deer Valley Lease, insofar as said default is
concerned.
6.

Except as expressly set forth herein, this Consent

and Agreement shall not be deemed to amend or modify the Deer
Valley Lease in any manner whatsoever.
7.

This Consent and Agreement is executed solely for

the benefit of Wells Fargo, may not be transferred or assigned
by Wells Fargo without the prior written consent of UPC, and
may not be enforced or relied upon by any party other than
Wells Fargo.
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8.

This Consent and Agreement shall be interpreted

and enforced in accordance with the laws of the State of Utah.
DATED this Z Z

day of December, 1982.
UNITED PARK CITY MINES COMPANY

By _
«^\.%.A
Vice President

LTE^T:
ATTEST

^ifc& \r-

Secretary

STATE OF TEXAS
COUNTY OF DALLAS

)
: ss.
)

On this 3.X**l day of December, 1982, personally appeared before me (JK^elcv ^-S€4gs
> who, being by me duly
sworn, did say that he is the V-ice President of United Park
City Mines Company, a Delaware corporation, and that the within
and foregoing Consent and Agreement was signed on behalf of
said corporation by authority of a resolution of it , Board of
Directors, and said UJkieA&r M. Se^g, <»
duly acknowledged to
me that said corporation executed the same and that the seal
affixed is the seal of said corporation.

P^AJU
^
NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing at:

My Commission E x p i r e s :

^
Q+IIAS. "TX.

ADDENDUM E
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Rule 56. Summary judgment.

(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories,
or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not soTespond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him.

Rule 4-501. Motions.

(2) Motions for summary judgment.

(b) Memorandum in opposition to a motion. The points and authorities in opposition to a motion for summary judgment shall begin with a
section that contains a concise statement of material facts as to which the
party contends a genuine issue exists. Each disputed fact shall be stated
in separate numbered sentences and shall specifically refer to those portions of the record upon which the opposing party relies, and, if applicable, shall state the numbered sentence or sentences of the movant's facts
that are disputed All material facts set forth in the movant's statement
and properly supported by an accurate reference to the record shall be
deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless specifically controverted by the opposing party's statement.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 15th day of February, 1991,1 caused the original and nine
true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.
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David K. Watkiss
David B. Watkiss
WATKISS & SAPERSTEIN
310 South Main Street, Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2171

James A. Boevers
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER
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PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
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Donald N. Dirks
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